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This paper offers a methodological contribution to the empirical analysis of the
relationships between banking and economic growth by suggesting a new indicator
for the state of development of the banking system based on a measure of bank
microeconomic efﬁciency. This choice helps to overcome the problem of causality
and to capture the effects of the banks’ allocative activity. This new approach is
then applied to analyse the relationship between the banking system and economic
growth in the Italian regions, through a dynamic panel technique. The empirical
results show the existence of an independent effect exerted by the efﬁciency of
banks on regional growth.
JEL codes: O40, G21, C33.
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In the 1990s, starting from the studies by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, 1993c),
a new body of empirical evidence – both at country level and regional level –
has indicated a positive relation between the level of development achieved by the
banking system and the growth rates of real variables (per-capita GDP, per-capita
productivity, valueadded ofindividual industrial sectors, sales byindividual ﬁrms).
Asfarastheroleofbanksineconomicgrowthisconcerned, themainweakness
in this new strand of literature is, we believe, the variables used to measure the
banking system’s state of development. These variables are of two types. The ﬁrst
referstothepresenceanddiffusionofthebankingsystem: herethemostcommonly
used indicators are the ratio between liquid liabilities of the banking system and
GDP (Gertler and Rose, 1994; King and Levine, 1993b, 1993c), or, in analysis at
the regional level, the proportion of bank branches to the resident population (Ferri
and Mattesini, 1997). The second group of variables instead measures the amount
of ﬁnancing intermediated by banks. Among these variables are the ratio between
domestic credit and GDP (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), the share of credit granted to
the private sector, or the credit granted to the private sector in ratio to GDP (King
and Levine, 1993b, 1993c; Levine, 1998, 1999; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999).
All these measures give rise to interpretative problems, and they are only par-
tiallyabletocapturetheroleperformedbybanksineconomicdevelopment. Firstly,
there is the problem of causality. The growth of the banking system and the amount
of credit disbursed are closely inﬂuenced by the level of economic development.
The wide presence of banks and the importance of bank lending in areas which
grow more rapidly than others may be indicative of a reverse causal relation be-
tween ﬁnance and economic growth. After all, banks grant credit on demand by
ﬁrms. In order to counter this classic objection, King, Levine and all contemporary
authors, like Goldsmith (1969) thirty years ago, resort to the classic argument of
post hoc ergo propter hoc: the presence of banks and the amount of credit granted
are good predictors of growth in subsequent years and can therefore be presumed
to be one of its causes. The weaknesses of this argument are equally well known.
Firstly, variables may have been omitted which explain both ﬁnancial development
and growth. Secondly, and especially, the capacity of the development of the bank-
ing system to predict growth may be due to the simple fact that production must be
ﬁnanced in advance. Consequently, in granting credit, the banks are only making
correct predictions about the future growth of the real economy. In short, as Rajan
and Zingales (1998, p. 560) have pointed out, “ﬁnancial development may simply
be a leading indicator rather than a causal factor”.
As well as being unable to shed adequate light on the causal relation between
the development of the banking system and economic growth, these two types of
measures have the further shortcoming that they essentially concentrate on the role
of banks in stimulating capital accumulation. Yet, as the recent economic litera-
ture has shown, the speciﬁc role performed by banks in the economic system is not
to intermediate savings, but rather to certify the quality of borrowers, monetizing
1liabilities which otherwise would fail to ﬁnd purchasers in the markets (Minsky,
1986; Moore, 1988; Fama, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988)1. Banks are essen-
tial for economic development in that they are a crucial device for the selection of
entrepreneurs and the allocation of (ﬁrst) ﬁnancial and (then) real resources (Dia-
mond, 1984). If this is the main function of banks, it is to this that the indicators of
the banking system’s development should, albeit imperfectly, refer.
In this paper, we propose a different approach to the measurement of banking
development. Theefﬁciencyofthebankingprocessforawholeareacanbethought
of as a function of the efﬁciency of the banks that operate in the area. Therefore,
we ﬁrst measure banks’ efﬁciency at a micro level using conventional microecono-
metric techniques, and then aggregate the results. Next, we interpret this measure
of efﬁciency as a proxy for the ability of banks to recognize the best entrepreneurs.
This approach has two important virtues. First, the efﬁciency of banks is a
measure which suffers less from the simultaneity bias and which is better equipped
to clarify the problem of the causality between ﬁnance and growth. The ability to
use inputs correctly is certainly less dependent of the growth rate of the economy
than the amount of bank credit. The level of economic development of an area may
inﬂuence the costs of banking activity (Sussman and Zeira, 1995), but it hardly
inﬂuences the available technology for such activity and banks’ ability to use it.
Besides, if banking loans simply mirrored investment opportunities, then the health
(efﬁciency) of banks would be insigniﬁcant for economic growth2.
Second, microeconomic efﬁciency seems better able to capture the allocative
function of banks, in that the abilities to use the available technology and to com-
bine the inputs into the production process optimally can be considered a necessary
condition for the correct allocation of resources.
In this paper, we use microeconomic efﬁciency of banks to investigate the role
of the banking system in the economic growth of the Italian regions. The rest
of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the reasons why
1This description of banking activity has been offered in the past by prestigious academics like
Wicksell, Schumpeter, von Mises, Kalecki and Keynes, and leading bankers like Albert Hahn or
Luigi Lugli. For example in 1920 the German banker Hahn wrote: “The activity of banks consists
[ ::: ], if one ignores the legal form and considers the economic signiﬁcance of the process as de-
cisive, in providing guarantees, in acting as the guarantors of borrowers. They furnish, so to speak,
borrowers with the general trust that they lack. On this view, therefore, they are none other than
intermediaries of credit in the literal sense of the expression, or in other words the intermediaries of
trust” (A. Hahn, 1920, our translation from Italian edition, p. 45). This assertion would most proba-
bly meet with general agreement today, with the difference that authors working in the mainstream
of the dominant theory (neoclassical or neo-Keynesian if more precise lables are to be employed)
would maintain that banks “intermediate trust” by intermediating savings, while those who adhere
to more heterodox schools of thought (post-Keynesian, post-Kaleckian, neo-Schumpeterian) would
claim that banks perform their functions by creating money.
2A similar reasoning is followed in Samolyk (1994), where the soundenss of a banks affects its
ability to attract deposits. Banks’ health condition is measured by some balance-sheet indicators like
the return on assets (ROA) or the share of nonperforming loans. However, balance-sheet indicators
are often affected by economic growth; besides, and more importantly, the presence of ﬁnancial
regulations (i.e. deposit insurance, existence of a lender of last resort) makes the nexus between
banks’ soundness and their deposit collection very weak.
2allocative efﬁciency of banks may play an autonomous role in explanation of eco-
nomic efﬁciency. Section 3 introduces the concept of efﬁciency and the relevant
estimation method. In section 4 a new indicator of the efﬁciency of the regional
banking system is introduced, based on micro data. This variable is then used in
the convergence analysis carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Credit allocation and bank efﬁciency
The economic literature has identiﬁed two broad channels through which banks
exert their inﬂuence on the process of economic growth. The ﬁrst of them, which
we may call Hicksian (Hicks, 1969), is capital accumulation: by reducing trans-
action costs and by diversifying risks, banks enable the mobilization of savings to
ﬁnance the investments necessary to stimulate and sustain economic development.
The other, which we may instead call Schumpeterian, emphasises the allocation of
credit: development is driven by innovations, the “different employment of existing
services of labour and land” (Schumpeter, 1934, Eng. ed., p. 95), and the role of
banks is to identify the enterpreneurs most able to introduce innovations, providing
them with the purchasing power necessary to divert the means of production from
their previous uses.
Although recent neoclassical theories of endogenous growth recognise the im-
portance of the allocation of credit among uses with differing levels of productivity,
in fact they have concentrated mainly on the channel of capital accumulation. In
these models, banks do not actually select among customers. Rather, by diversify-
ing (liquidity and credit) risks and reducing transaction costs, they simply enable
the ﬁnancing of entrepreneurial initiatives which ensure high returns, but which,
because of their greater illiquidity or the greater information costs associated with
them, in the absence of intermediaries would not have been ﬁnanced3. Interest-
ing exceptions are the models of King and Levine (1993c) and Galetovic (1994).
In these cases, the entrepreneurial abilities of individuals are uncertain, and banks
are obliged to select their clients. Although both models introduce some simpli-
fying hypotheses — for example, that banks possess perfect screening technology
— they indicate an analytically rigorous way to analyse the allocative function of
banks and its inﬂuence on economic growth.
As far as the empirical evidence is concerned, the analyses carried out to date
still seem far from capturing satisfactorily the function of banks in the allocation
process. Despite constant references to the Schumpeterian view of ﬁnance and
3In some models (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Greenwood and Smith, 1997), the presence of
banks mitigates that liquidity risks of individual depositors and thus permits the ﬁnancing of illiquid
but more productive investments. In others, by contrast, the diversiﬁcation of credit risks makes
it possible to delegate the selection and monitoring of ﬁrms to banks (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and
Prescott, 1986), and by reducing information costs it makes it possible to ﬁnance activities which are
more productive but also more uncertain and more difﬁcult to evaluate (Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1990), or to increase production specialisation (Galetovic, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998; Cooley
and Smith, 1998).
3growth, the indicators used to proxy ﬁnancial development are always quantita-
tive variables, like the amount of liquid liabilities or the credit granted by banks,
without any attempt being made to measure the efﬁciency of banks in the process
of resources allocation4. The only measure of ﬁnancial development which seeks
to capture allocative aspects is the share of ﬁnancing granted to the private sector
compared with the overall amount of ﬁnancing supplied to the economy5. This ap-
proach is based on the two premises that the private sector is more efﬁcient than the
public one, and that some sort of crowding-out effect operates among the ﬁnanc-
ing granted to different operators6. Obviously, neither of these hypotheses can be
taken for granted. But what is more important is that economic development poli-
cies pursued by governments matter more than the allocative decisions of banks
for the share of credit granted to the public sector in backward areas.
In some other recent papers (King and Levine, 1993b; Beck et al., 1999; Levine
et. al., 1999), the importance of the allocation of ﬁnancial resources for growth has
been investigated through the choice of the dependent variable. In particular, in or-
der to discriminate between the Hicksian and Schumpeterian models, the indicators
of ﬁnancial development are regressed on the rate of per-capita capital accumula-
tion and on a measure of the rate of growth of per-capita productivity. As Beck et
al. (1999, p. 29) point out, given the greater robustness of estimates which refer to
the rate of productivity growth, the results obtained tend to favour the Schumpete-
rian model: “better functioning banks improve resource allocation and accelerate
total factor productivity growth with positive repercussions for long-run growth”.
However, in the absence of any attempt at direct evaluation of the efﬁciency of
banks in the allocative process, it seems very difﬁcult to determine the extent to
which productivity growth is due to prudent choices by banks, and the extent to
which it is instead due to the better quality of local entrepreneurs.
In sum, the general reference model currently used in the literature is the fol-
lowing:
g = f (Y0; C0; X0) (1)
where g is the growth rate of the real variable used to measure the level of de-
velopment, Y0 is the income level in the initial period, C0 is the amount of credit
4Generally, the total amount of credit (performing and non-performing loans) used in empirical
analyses captures aspects relative to both capital accumulation and to the (mis)allocation of credit
(non-performing loans); however, these two aspects should have been kept distinct by calculating the
credit granted by banks net of non-performing loans.
5On this issue see Levine (1997). Similar interpretations can be made of the variable deﬁned by
the ratio between credit granted by commercial banks and total credit (including that granted by the
central bank). However, this variable, which is used in cross-country studies, is only relevant to some
of the less developed countries, where intervention by central banks in the ﬁnancing of the economy
has signiﬁcant size.
6This is obviously the traditional hypothesis that the fundamental engine of economic develop-
ment is savings, which, for the economy as a whole and at every moment of time, is a given amount.
Evidently, this is anything but a Schumpeterian hypothesis: “if we included savings as a major fac-
tor initiating economic change”, Schumpeter writes (1939, p. 83), “we would be including in our
premises part of what we are attempting to explain”.
4(including bad loans) granted by banks to the economy in the same period, and
X0 is a vector of other ﬁnancial variables and control variables. Considering a
log-linear speciﬁcation, the model can be written as follows:
y = y0 + 
c0 + x0 +  (2)
where lower case letters denote logarithms of the variables and  denotes the error
term.
We propose replacing C0 with a new measure of the development of the bank-
ing system which takes explicit account of the efﬁciency of banks. Speciﬁcally, the





where 0 is a measure of the inefﬁciency of banks at the beginning of the period
and  indicates the weight of such inefﬁciency on the allocative process7. By sub-
stituting (3) in (2), the function to estimate becomes:
y = y0 + 
c0   e ln(1 + 0) + x0 +  (4)
where e  = 
.
The model described by (4) is a generalization of model (2), in which  may
assume values other than zero. If the Hicksian model prevailed, 
 would have to
assume positive values, while e  would not be signiﬁcantly different from zero. In
theoppositecase, werebothcoefﬁcientsdifferfromzero, theSchumpeterianmodel
could not be discarded. The allocation of credit would perform an autonomous
function in explaining the role performed by banks in the process of economic
growth, the importance of which would be given by the ratio e =
.
This is the formulation that we shall use in the following sections to estimate
the role fulﬁlled by banks in the recent economic growth of the Italian regions.
However, it is ﬁrst necessary to clarify how the inefﬁciency of a local banking
system can be measured.
3 Measuring efﬁciency
The determination of banking efﬁciency requires the solution of three main issues:
the choice of the concept of efﬁciency, the deﬁnition banking inputs and outputs,
and the choice of the estimation method.
7In this case, the inclusion of overdue loans in C0 would be neutralized by the presence of 0,
provided of course that the inefﬁciency measure is calculated without considering overdue loans
53.1 The concept of efﬁciency
The choice of which concept of efﬁciency to use obviously depends on the type
of analysis to be conducted. If the intention is to study the relation between the
banking system and the economic growth of a particular area, the focus should be
on a concept of macroeconomic allocative efﬁciency, namely the ability to select
the projects with the greatest impact on development. However, when one attempts
to translate this capacity to select and control investment projects into measurable
variables, enormous difﬁculties arise. Not coincidentally, the large body of empir-
ical literature which has addressed the problem of measuring banking efﬁciency
has concerned itself exclusively with the concept of microeconomic technical efﬁ-
ciency, variously deﬁned, leaving measurement of macroeconomic allocative efﬁ-
ciency entirely unexplored.
Although none of the efﬁciency measures proposed in the literature directly
captures the ability of banks to identify the investment projects more favourable
to development, we believe that microeconomic efﬁciency is a better proxy for
macroeconomic efﬁciency than are the indicators of the ﬁnancial system’s develop-
ment commonly used in the literature. Firstly, it likely that microeconomic techni-
cal efﬁciency is more or less closely linked to macroeconomic allocative efﬁciency.
Secondly, microeconomic efﬁciency suffers less than usual ﬁnancial sector indica-
tors from the bias of the simultaneity between credit and development. Again, it
is reasonable to believe that, although a bank’s ability to exploit the available tech-
nology in the best manner possible may be inﬂuenced, to some extent, by the level
of development of the region in which it operates, it is relatively independent of
that economy’s growth rate.
Two main concepts of microeconomic efﬁciency are analysed in the literature:
cost efﬁciency and proﬁt efﬁciency. The former measures a bank’s ability to pro-
duce a given set of outputs at given input prices as economically as possible given
the technology available. The latter indicated a bank’s capacity to maximise proﬁts
given the prices of inputs and outputs8. In symbols, analyses of efﬁciency presup-
poses the following production process:
O = O(p;G;u) (5)
where O is the vector of the variables that must be optimised (variable costs in the
case of cost efﬁciency, or proﬁts in the case of proﬁt efﬁciency), p is the vector
of the prices of the inputs, G is a vector of given variables (quantities of output
in cost efﬁciency, its prices in proﬁt efﬁciency), and u is a residual element which
compounds inefﬁciency and a random error.
Although we are aware that each measure grasps different aspects of efﬁciency,
and may therefore contribute separately to identify the most efﬁcient banks from
8An alternative measure for proﬁt efﬁciency has recently been proposed in order to capture the
fact that the products supplied by banks may be of very different quality. This measure considers the
capacity of banks to maximise proﬁts for a given level of output quality, rather than for given levels
of their prices (cf. Berger et al., 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997).
6the allocative point of view, for our purposes we deemed it more correct to refer to
cost efﬁciency. Neither cost efﬁciency nor proﬁt efﬁciency directly expresses the
ability of banks to identify those investment projects most favourable for develop-
ment. However, whilst a bank’s ability to make proﬁts may not coincide with its
ability to ﬁnance development, the ability to use the available technology correctly
while minimising costs is a necessary condition for the efﬁcient allocation of re-
sources. Moreover, the hypothesis implicit in proﬁt efﬁciency, namely that banks
do not inﬂuence the process of price formation, strikes us as implausible when
applied to the Italian banking market of the 1980s and 1990s.
3.2 The deﬁnition of inputs and outputs
In the case of cost efﬁciency, (5) can be rewritten as follows:
V C = V C(p;q;u) (6)
where V C denotes the variable costs and q the quantities produced. Econometric
treatment of (6) ﬁrst requires the deﬁnition of the inputs and outputs of banking
activity. This, of course, is a vexed question which the large amount of literature
on the topic has been unable to resolve.
With respect to the most commonly used deﬁnitions9, here we prefer to adopt
a hybrid approach where banking outputs comprise both stock variables and ﬂow
variables. In particular, bank products are deﬁned as total loans and deposits, and
proceeds from services. The use of stock variables to approximate the value of
output can be justiﬁed on the ground that loans and deposits require the constant
production of services, so that they constitute an acceptable proxy for banking
output (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In order to capture the quality of output, and
therefore the level of protection against risk ensured by a particular balance sheet
structure (McAllister and McManus, 1993), we have only considered performing
loans. Finally, we have also considered certain items on the proﬁt and loss account
(commissions and proceeds from brokerage services) in order to capture the con-
tribution made to output by banking services which are not reﬂected in the amount
of loans and deposits10.
The production factors considered are intermediated funds, labour and ﬁxed
capital. The relative prices have been respectively approximated by the ratio be-
tween interest rates on bank liabilities and the total of intermediated funds11, by
the ratio between expenditure on personnel and number of employees, and by the
ratio between costs, sundry expenses and amortisation, on the one hand, and inter-
mediated funds on the other. In the last case, the use of intermediated funds, rather
9For a brief survey of the most widely used approaches see Favero and Papi (1995).
10This latter component is of particular importance in Italy, where banks carry out most of their
customers’ transactions in state securities for them.
11The long-standing problem of the twofold nature of deposits in the deﬁnition of banking inputs
and outputs has been solved here by following Berger and Humphrey (1991), i.e. by including the
cost of funding among the inputs and the volume of deposits among the outputs.
7than the value of capital, reﬂects the distortions to which capital is subject when
reported in the accounting records of banks (Mester, 1987).
3.3 Estimation method
The techniques usually employed in the analysis of the efﬁciency of credit agen-
cies12 can be grouped under two broad headings: DEA techniques (also called
non-parametric) and stochastic frontier techniques13.
In this paper we use a parametric estimate with a stochastic frontier in which,
following the usual practice in the applied literature, the disturbance term is as-
sumed as deriving from the sum of a normal random variable and a semi-normal
random variable. We prefer a parametric technique for two principal reasons. First,
deﬁning the optimal technology in terms of a restricted number of estimable pa-
rameters allows one to check, albeit heuristically, whether the function estimated is
coherent with the a priori hypotheses about the technology (for example about the
nature of the returns to scale) and its evolution over time. Veriﬁcation of this kind
is impossible with DEA techniques, because the production possibility frontier is
deﬁned by the envelope of techniques used by the efﬁcient units in the sample. Sec-
ondly, a parametric estimate allows one to associate the estimates of the efﬁciency
of individual units with certain statistical properties: in our case, the fact that unbi-
ased estimators of efﬁciency exist at the level of the individual bank means that it
is possible to construct unbiased estimators at the region level.
The efﬁciency variable was constructed using a classic stochastic frontier tech-
nique (cf. Aigner et al., 1977) with a Cobb-Douglas function applied to a cost
function. The choice of a simple function like Cobb-Douglas, rather than a ﬂexible
functional form, was due to data problems. Since there very little cross-section
variation among the factor prices in our dataset, a more general functional form
would have caused problems of identiﬁcation. Experiments with a translog func-
tional form yielded disappointing results, because the coefﬁcients estimated dis-
played such marked temporal variability that it could not be attributed to changes
in technology, but rather to severe problems of multicollinearity14.
Finally, the choice of the semi-normal as distribution for the inefﬁciency term
is standard practice in the literature, even though different solutions have been pro-
posed: for example, the exponential or gamma distributions (see eg chapter 2 in
Fried et al.). Experiments with the exponential distribution did not substantially
alter the efﬁciency rankings, and we consequently opted for the more common so-
lution. There is still the possibility that poor speciﬁcation may make the scores
12For a complete and up-to-date survey see Berger and Humphrey (1997).
13For a survey of DEA and stochastic frontier methods see the special issue of Journal of Econo-
metrics on the topic (no. 1-2, 1990) or Fried et al. (1993). A succinct but recent survey is provided
by Kalijaran and Shand (1999).
14The condition number calculated for the matrix of the price correlations in logarithms and their
cross-referenced products ranges from a minimum of 166.97 for 1988 to a maximum of 272.83 for
1994. Considering that the collinearity problem begins to arise for a condition number greater than
20, the fact speaks for itself.
8non-comparable over time. However, in our case the parameters of the cost func-
tions were sufﬁciently stable for us to conclude that, even if the levels of the inef-
ﬁciency estimates were not entirely accurate, their evolution over time would still
be preserved. In any event, the introduction of the temporal dummies in the panel
estimates presented in Section 5 renders this problem inconsequential.
4 A new indicator for regional banking efﬁciency
The data used in this paper were taken from a sample comprising almost all Italy’s
commercial banks, with the sole exception of cooperative credit banks. Our sam-
ple represented a large proportion of the banking sector in all the Italian regions
(more than 75% when measured in terms of bank branches), except for Trentino-
Alto Adige where the large number of cooperative banks signiﬁcantly reduced the
sample’s representativeness (just under 40% of the total number of bank branches
in the region). The period analysed was from 1982 to 199415. Information about
balance sheets and proﬁt and loss accounts was provided by ABI for the initial
years and extracted from the Bilbank database for the year 1994.
Table 1: Description of the sample
1982 1985 1988 1991
No. banks 196 196 215 198
V C 394.851 428.041 509.586 841.727
Q1 3113.180 3710.850 5974.470 9585.630
Q2 18.881 26.586 39.318 55.596
P1 35.338 52.264 65.168 85.356
P2 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.017
P3 0.108 0.093 0.061 0.066
Legend:
V C : total variable costs
Q1 : output 1 (sum of loans and deposits)
Q2 : output 2 (proceeds from customer services)
P1 : price of input 1 (unit cost of labour)
P2 : price of input 2 (unit cost of ﬁxed capital)
P3 : price of input 3 (unit cost of intermediated funds)
Table 1 gives the size of our sample for various years as well as the average
values of the variables considered during the econometric analysis of efﬁciency.
15The choice of the time period was constrained, at this stage of the research, by the availability
of the archives at the Centrale dei Bilanci. Nevertheless the years analysed represent a period in
which banks acquired greater operational freedom after the 1970s, years which were characterised
by various administrative restrictions.
9The data summarised in Table 1 were used to estimate a Cobb-Douglas cost
function (see the previous section), i.e. a log-linear function:
vci = b0 + b1q1i + b2q2i + b3p1i + b4p2i + b5p3i + i (7)
where i denotes the i-th bank and lower case letters are for logarithms. The error
term i is given by the sum ui + vi, in which ui is the disturbance term (N(0;2
u))
and vi is the inefﬁciency term (jN(0;2
v)j).
Table 2: Cost function estimates
1982 1985 1988 1991
b0 -0.625 -1.755 -1.231 -1.494
(-2.779) (-5.463) (-3.731) (-4.092)
b1 0.922 0.956 1.004 0.990
(35.506) (39.877) (91.327) (33.202)
b2 0.087 0.053 0.011 0.020
(3.519) (2.326) (1.103) (0.703)
b4 0.192 0.127 0.204 0.173
(8.535) (4.255) (8.087) (5.296)
b5 0.572 0.532 0.580 0.582
(11.441) (11.630) (14.267) (10.834)
 2.867 3.151 2.290 2.162
(4.247) (3.724) (4.679) (3.752)
 0.141 0.147 0.141 0.137
(14.389) (18.389) (14.261) (12.701)
Log-lik. 60.052 55.976 55.232 53.582
t-statistics in brackets.
We imposed the requirement of linear homogeneity (b3 + b4 + b5 = 1) on the
cost function – using the price of labour as the numeraire – and estimated equation
(7) with the maximum likelihood method. Although the literature suggests meth-
ods to estimate cost frontiers with panel data (e.g. Cornwell et al., 1990; Park et al.,
1998), we preferred to conduct separate estimates for the four years in order to take
account of changes in technology during the period and to avoid the imposition of
any predetermined temporal structure on the behaviour over time of the individual
efﬁciency scores. As is customary in the applied literature on stochastic frontiers,
rather than estimating the two variances 2
u and 2
v, we estimated two parameters




v and  = v
u, which are evidently invertible
transformations of the original parameters.
Estimation results are given in Table 2. The coefﬁcients estimated display sub-
stantial stability, suggesting the existence of a technology which varies gradually
over time and of shares of output which are practically stable. In particular, the es-
timations reveal slight economies of scale in more traditional products (loans and
10deposits), given that the value of b1 is slightly less than 1, but marked increasing
returns in the production of services. Moreover, the dispersion of the efﬁciency
measures declines mainly in the last years of the period, probably because the
banking sector became more competitive at that time.
In order to calculate the efﬁciency estimates for individual banks, we used the
technique developed by Jondrow et al. (1982), where inefﬁciency is measured as
the expected value of vi given i, i.e.









where () and () are, respectively, the density and distribution functions of a
standardised normal random variable. When performing the calculations, obvi-
ously, we substituted the true values of the parameters with their maximum likeli-
hood estimates.
Table 3: Inefﬁciency scores of the banking systems
1982 1985 1988 1991
Piemonte 16.2% 16.1% 15.8% 17.7%
Valle D’Aosta 19.2% 18.6% 18.3% 20.9%
Liguria 16.3% 16.8% 14.4% 14.3%
Lombardia 14.4% 12.3% 11.0% 12.6%
Trentino-Alto Adige 16.9% 11.5% 11.3% 10.4%
Veneto 10.6% 10.4% 8.5% 9.3%
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 11.6% 12.5% 11.5% 10.5%
Emilia-Romagna 9.7% 10.7% 11.0% 10.0%
Toscana 14.2% 13.3% 13.2% 14.0%
Umbria 13.4% 15.7% 14.3% 13.2%
Marche 11.4% 14.6% 13.5% 11.8%
Lazio 21.6% 25.7% 19.5% 16.6%
Abruzzi 13.6% 16.3% 15.5% 13.7%
Molise 13.1% 20.6% 20.7% 18.6%
Campania 20.6% 25.2% 24.3% 23.3%
Puglia 19.9% 20.1% 21.0% 17.8%
Basilicata 14.5% 17.4% 19.9% 19.7%
Calabria 12.9% 13.8% 14.2% 14.5%
Sicilia 17.0% 22.3% 19.2% 13.3%
Sardegna 21.7% 23.6% 18.7% 25.3%
Note that vi is the logarithm of the ratio between the cost effectively sustained
by the bank and the cost that it would have sustained had it been efﬁcient. It can
therefore be interpreted as a percentage of the costs theoretically obtainable.
11Moving from the efﬁciency of individual banks to measurement of regional
efﬁciency, we used a weighted average in which the weights were the presence of
bank i in region j. Since we did not possess information about loans by each bank
disaggregated by region, we based our analysis on the number of bank branches.
By doing so, we implicity introduced two hypotheses: the ﬁrst, which is highly
plausible, is that a bank’s production function is the same in every region; the
second, which is perhaps more debatable, is that the efﬁciency of the branches of
bank i in the various regions is independent of their location. However, adoption of
this second hypothesis was obligatory with the data available to us. In actual fact,
choosing the region as the geographical unit of analysis made this hypothesis less
stringent than might appear, because the implicit condition is only that the bank
branches located in each region are on average equally efﬁcient. Moreover, since
we were interested in the allocative efﬁciency of banks, it should also be pointed
out that the granting of larger amounts of credit is usually handled by the central
branches of banks, not by local branches.
The indicator we propose for the inefﬁciency of the banking system of each





where i refers to the banks and j refers to the regions; wij is the number of bank
j’s branches in region i16.
The results of this procedure are summarised in Table 3. As far as we know,
this is the ﬁrst attempt to measure the efﬁciency of regional banking systems taking
account of the banks effectively in operation, rather than merely ones with their
headquarters in a region. The econometric results plot a map of banking efﬁciency
which largely conﬁrms received beliefs about geographical ﬁnancial disparities in
Italy, but which in certain respects contradicts them, showing in particular that the
regionsof theNorth-East aremore efﬁcient, and mitigatingthedifferential between
North and South.
5 Bank efﬁciency and growth: empirical evidence
5.1 Panel estimators
Our empirical analysis of the effects of the banking system’s efﬁciency on re-
gional growth employed tools used to study long-term growth, and in particular
16Jondrow at al. (1982) suggest that vi can be alternatively estimated using the mode of the
conditional distribution rather than its expected value. We have used the mean rather than the mode
in order to improve the properties of the aggregate index. Since this is a weighted average, the
unbiasedness of ^ vi as an estimator of vi is transferred to ^ Vj as estimator of Vj. Moreover, the use
of the region as the unit of aggregation suggests that the measurement errors committed at the level
of the individual bank are attenuated when one moves to the area level on the basis of a standard
argument on the variance of weighted sum of random variables.
12so-called “convergence regressions”. These regressions typically analyse the ef-
fect on growth of the initial income level (plus some control variables) in a cross-
section context (the literature is enormous: an outstanding example is Mankiw et
al., 1992). Within this methodology, use of panel estimators has recently been
growing. These latter enable the analyst to incorporate into a single effect, unob-
served and speciﬁc to each geographical unit used, all the characteristics of that
unit not comprised among the control variables. In symbols:
yi;t = ~ yi;t 1 + zi;t + i + ui;t (10)
where, with respect to the symbols used in equation (4), ~  = +1 and the vector z
comprises the variables hypothesised as determining the steady state income level:
for example, the quantity of human capital, variously measured, or the level of
infrastructures. The term i incorporates all the unobserved determinants of the
steady state, whose variation over time is nil or negligible.
The use of longitudinal data in the empirical literature is relatively recent. This
is because it presupposes the use of dynamic panel techniques which are still being
developed: it is well known, in fact, that traditional techniques to estimate linear
models with longitudinal data produce inconsistent estimators when lagged values
of the dependent variables are among the independent variables and the temporal
span of the sample is limited.
If we consider a model like equation (10), the fact that the individual effect i
does not vary over time means that — for ~  6= 0 — it is necessarily correlated with
yi;t 1, which makes the OLS estimator inconsistent. It can be shown (see Nickell,
1981) that the traditional estimators in a static context (Within and GLS) suffer
from the same problem.
Itisthereforenecessarytouseothertechniques. Themostimportantprecedents
in applied studies of growth determinants are Knight et al. (1993), Islam (1995)
and Caselli et al. (1996). While the ﬁrst two studies use Chamberlain’s (1982) 
technique, Caselli et al. use a GMM estimator, rightly arguing that this approach
avoids regressor endogeneity problems.
The use of panel techniques has been criticised by Barro (1997), mainly be-
cause of the ampliﬁcation of measurement error and the overlapping of business
cycle effects and long-period growth. From an econometric point of view, both
criticisms stem from the fact that the estimator in differences entirely ignores cross-
sectionvariabilitytoconcentrateonintra-temporalvariability. Moreover, theuseof
equations in differences often raises the practical problem of ‘weak’ instruments
(namely, instrumental variables that have little correlation with the explanatory
variables) and this severely impairs the efﬁciency of the estimator.
To deal with the problem, like Beck et al. (1999) and Levine et al. (1999),
we used the Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator, which combines equations in
differences and levels in a GMM logic17.
17The calculations were made using the DPD98 program kindly made available to us by Steve
13A brief illustration of this estimator may conveniently begin with a version of
equation (10) in ﬁrst differences:
yi;t = ~ yi;t 1 + zi;t + ui;t (11)
Since the differentiation eliminates the term i, if it were not for the correlation
between yi;t 1 (present in yi;t 1) and ui;t 1 (present in ui;t), application of
OLS would yield consistent18 estimates of equation (11). However, this problem
can be easily avoided by noting that all the observed values of yi antecedent to
time t can be used as instruments. On this consideration alone, the estimator used
in Caselli et al. (1996) is obtained. Arellano and Bover (1995), however, point out
that it is possible to achieve more efﬁcient estimates in the presence of predeter-
mined variables whose correlation with the individual effect is constant over time.
The ﬁrst differences of these variables can be used as instruments in equation (10).
The Arellano and Bover estimator, in fact, is the one which results when equations
(10-11) are treated as a system to be estimated jointly.
This estimator had performed very convincingly in a recent article by Blun-
dell and Bond (1998), which analyses the properties of various panel estimators
by means of Monte Carlo experiments. It should also be noted that the properties
of the class estimators that we used have been studied for a very large number of
individuals (the regions in our case). In this application, one may justiﬁably ask
whether the decision to concentrate on the twenty Italian regions impedes interpre-
tation of the results19.
5.2 The estimated model
The speciﬁcation used for the estimates, which reﬂects that of the theoretical model
outlined in previous sections, is the following:
yi;t =  + ~ yi;t 1 + 
ci;t 1   ~ ln(1 + ^ i;t 1) + xi;t 1 + t + i + vi;t (12)
where the dependent variable is per-capita value added at factor cost and at 1990
prices.
As regards the parameters, ~  is the key parameter in the convergence analy-
sis, and it should be signiﬁcantly less than 1 for conditional convergence to come
about20. The two parameters for the model set out in Section 2 (see equation (4))
are 
 and ~ , which are respectively associated with the variables C and . The latter
Bond.
18Though not efﬁcient, given that the disturbance term is serially correlated by construction; more-
over, the form of the serial correlation is known, so that a GLS strategy can be applied.
19Nevertheless, increasing the sample size is not theoretically possible, and in any case many of
the variables that we used are imprecise indicators of the theoretical variables, so that overly detailed
examination of the estimates is probably inappropriate.
20Unit root tests in a panel context have been systematically performed by various authors (e.g.
Evans, 1998). Since we are not interested in pursuing this point, we shall not conduct formal tests of
this type.
14is the indicator of the inefﬁciency of the regional banking system obtained using
the methods described in Section 3.
Variable C was measured using an indicator (henceforth FIN) which represents
the ratio between loans disbursed in the region by banks and special credit insti-
tutions and the regional GDP. It is this variable that we suppose has an effect on
growth which may be attenuated by the presence of an inefﬁcient banking system.
Vector x contains other ﬁnancial variables and control variables. Particular
care was taken over selecting the auxiliary ﬁnancial variables. Since it was our
intention to investigate the presence of an independent effect of bank efﬁciency
on economic growth, we regarded it as important to consider various channels of
inﬂuence between the ﬁnancial and real sectors, in order to prevent the inﬂuence
of bank efﬁciency from becoming indistinguishable from the effects of other vari-
ables. It was for this reason that, in addition to the efﬁciency variable and the FIN
variable, we considered two further ﬁnancial variables: PRIV and BLOC.
PRIV is the share of bank loans granted to the private sector on total loans,
while BLOC is the share of loans by cooperative banks (former artisan and rural
banks) on credit provided by all commercial banks in the region. We expected all
the ﬁnancial indicators to have positive sign. FIN, in fact, can be viewed as an
indicator of the economy’s level of ﬁnancing, which normally correlates positively
with the level of economic activity. PRIV should instead capture some of the func-
tions typical of intermediaries. The hypothesis is that a regional banking system
which allocates a larger amount of credit to the private sector is more careful in its
selection and monitoring of customers. Finally, BLOC should indicate the relative
importance of local banks which, by virtue of their close relations with the local
community and their ownership structure, should alleviate the information prob-
lems between borrowers and ﬁnancers21, thereby fostering the growth of the small
and medium-sized ﬁrms that are so important to Italy’s economy22.
As control variables, we used three indicators intended to capture aspects rel-
ative to the availability of human capital, transport costs, and the efﬁciency of the
legal system. As a proxy for human capital (CAPUM) we adopted the ratio be-
tween enrolments at upper secondary school and enrolments at lower secondary
school. Given the time period analysed, we regarded this indicator as more sig-
niﬁcant than the illiteracy rate often used in convergence analyses23. Moreover,
this indicator enabled us to take account of the school drop-out rate, although this
displays differences in the age structure of the population between the northern and
southern regions.
21The speciﬁc charecteristics of Italian local banks have been described and analysed empirically
by Angelini et al. (1997) and Cannari and Signorini (1997).
22Inclusion of the BLOC variable was also necessary for a technical reason: since the efﬁciency
indicator was constructed excluding most of the small banks from the sample, it is likely that there
is a correlation between error in the efﬁciency measure and the weight of small banks in the local
system considered. Consequently, the BLOC variable was also included in order to alleviate the
adverse consequences on the estimator of ~  of mismeasurement of .
23With regard to Italy, the illiteracy rate has been used by Cosci and Mattesini (1998).
15As an indicator of transport costs (TRA) we used the ratio between kilometres
of motorway, main roads and railways and the region’s size in square kilometres.
In principle, as also shown by the recent literature on economic geography24, the
relation between this variable and the regional growth rate is ambiguous. While
on the one hand lower transport costs encourage the location of production units,
on the other they reduce, in the presence of supply-side constraints, the costs of
shipping goods and increase the substitutability of local goods with imported ones.
Finally, we sought to take account of the efﬁciency of the legal system and
the amount of protection for property rights. This is an aspect investigated by
numerous authors (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998) and it is now being analysed by
empirical studies on ﬁnance and growth at the international level25. Since our
analysis was carried out at the regional level, where the law is the same for all
regions, we decided to refer to the efﬁciency of the regional judicial system. For
this purpose, we constructed an indicator (LEG) taking account of the number of
received and discharged bankruptcies in each year, weighted by their average size.










is an increasing and concave function of its size. This variable was naturally ex-
pected to enter the convergence regression with positive sign.
All the variables are measured at the beginning of each three-year period to
which the variation in the dependent variable refers, and they are in logarithms
with the exception of the LEG variable. The inclusion of the term i is equivalent
to the introduction of dummy variables, and it was necessary in order to purge the
estimate of business cycle effects and incorrect measurement of efﬁciency.
5.3 Estimation results
The results of the empirical analysis are set out in Table 4, which gives the es-
timates of the coefﬁcients associated with the main explanatory variables26. The
table shows three different speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst column comprises all the vari-
ables indicated by the model described earlier, while the other two refer to slightly
different speciﬁcations where some explanatory variables are omitted.
24For a recent survey see Ottaviano and Puga (1997).
25Rajan and Zingales (1998) approximate the degree of protection for creditors’ rights with the in-
dex of accounting standards in countries constructed by the Center for International Financial Anal-
ysis and Research. Levine (1998, 1999), Beck et. al. (1999) and Levine et. al. (1999) instead control
for the importance of normative aspects with the legal origin of the country, as proposed by La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998).
26In order to facilitate reading, the coefﬁcients of the constant and of the temporal dummies have
been omitted. All of them are statistically signiﬁcant.
16Table 4: Panel estimates
y(-1) 0.890 0.926 0.805
(13.891) (19.088) (11.571)
Ineff. -0.499 -0.457 -0.849
(-1.300) (-1.557) (-2.253)
FIN 0.114 0.053 0.231
(3.344) (1.747) (3.083)








LEG 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.059) (1.134) (-0.690)
Sargan test 10.46418 13.11036 8.288778
df 62 54 54
p 1 1 1
sc(1) -1.633 -2.116 -0.64
p 0.102 0.034 0.522
sc(2) -0.573 -0.434 -1.637
p 0.567 0.664 0.102
t-statistics in brackets.
The diagnostic tests shown are the ones conventionally used in this type of
context. The Sargan test takes as its null hypothesis the validity of the over-
identiﬁcation conditions implicit in the GMM estimate. In ur estimates the null
hypothesis is accepted in all cases. The serial correlation tests performed on the
residuals of equation (11) yielded the results expected: the presence of a ﬁrst-order
negative serial correlation (note that the disturbance of the equation in differences
is vt) and the absence of a second-order serial correlation.
Our results show the existence of a rate of conditional convergence equal to
around 3% per year. This value is more or less in line with the ﬁndings of cross-
section analyses for Italy by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Cosci and Mattesini
(1997) and Ferri and Mattesini (1997), while it conﬂicts with the results obtained
by Paci and Pigliaru (1995) and Mauro and Podrecca (1995), who found no conver-
gence among the Italian regions in the 1980s. Also the coefﬁcients of the control
variables show the expected sign (except in one case, in which however the co-
efﬁcient was not signiﬁcantly different from 0), although some variables do not
17display particular signiﬁcance, most notably human capital27. In these cases, the
small size of the sample and measurement error probably played a substantial role.
In this context of convergence, the coefﬁcient associated with the inefﬁciency
variable assumes the negative sign that we expected for all the speciﬁcations con-
sidered. The zero setting hypothesis is not rejected at a 5% level of conﬁdence,
although the value of the t-statistic is never particularly low. This result assumes
even greater importance if one considers that our variable  shows, as said, a less
marked amount of geographical disparity than might have been expected on the
basis of the previous empirical evidence. Moreover, we ﬁnd the expected signs and
statistically signiﬁcant effects for almost all the ﬁnancial variables. Our empirical
results therefore support the hypothesis that the banking system is associated with
variations in income through various channels. Particularly signiﬁcant are both the
FIN variableand our indicatorof the inefﬁciency ofregional banking systems. This
conﬁrms the importance of the inﬂuence exerted by ﬁnancial variables operating
not only through capital accumulation, as already emphasised in the literature, but
also through the degree of banking efﬁciency in a particular geographical area. To
return to the opposition between the Hicksian and Schumpeterian channels men-
tioned earlier, it is possible to argue that our results cannot exclude the importance
of both channels.
These results also appear to be sufﬁciently robust in the light of the fact that
our speciﬁcations considered various ﬁnancial variables in order to control for the
possible presence of other channels as carefully as possible. Interesting in this
regard is the importance of the PRIV variable, which to a certain extent may also
be interpreted as a variable tied to the most typical functions of banks, those of
selecting and monitoring customers28. It will be remembered that PRIV refers to
the total loans granted by all banks, including local banks and smaller ones, which
were partially excluded in our measure of regional banking efﬁciency. This fact
may help explain why the other ﬁnancial variable, BLOC, has a low signiﬁcance
level 29. It should be noted, moreover, that the BLOC variable was also included,
as said, in order to eliminate some of the distorting effects of measurement error
on the variable , so that the coefﬁcient associated with the BLOC variable should
have in any case a rather weak interpretative signiﬁcance.
27Similar results have been obtained by Mauro and Podrecca (1994) and Paci and Pigliaru (1995).
28A similar variable has been used by Cosci and Mattesini (1997), who ﬁnd that the ratio between
credit to the private sector and GDP has a signiﬁcant bearing on the growth of the Italian provinces,
although it is restricted to certain periods and in particular speciﬁcations of their model.
29With reference to Italy, the importance of smaller cooperative banks has been documented by
several studies. For example, Cosci and Mattesini (1997) ﬁnd a positive relation between local
growth and the number of cooperative banks operating in the area, while Cannari and Signorini
(1997) ﬁnd that cooperative banks, compared with other banks, ration their clientele to a lesser extent
and have less risky portfolios.
186 Conclusions
The initial hypothesis of this paper was that banks are essential for explanation of
economic growth, because they mainly perform the function of selecting and mon-
itoring entrepreneurs, and therefore of allocating ﬁnancial (and real) resources.
There is by now general consensus on this function in the economic literature.
However, the studies that have sought to investigate it empirically have not kept
pace with theoretical developments. In the majority of cases, applied studies have
used ﬁnancial development indicators which refer to structural aspects of the bank-
ing system, neglecting the allocative function performed by banks.
This paper’s aim is to offer a methodological contribution to the empirical
analysis of the relationships between banks and economic growth by suggesting
a measure of bank microeconomic efﬁciency as a new proxy for the state of devel-
opment of the banking system. This measure contributes to overcome the problem
of causality and to capture the allocative function of banks.
In particular, the paper has proposed a speciﬁcation of the growth equation
which makes it possible to isolate the role played by the allocative function of
banks in the growth process. In so doing, the paper provides an empirical contri-
bution to the question of the channels through which the banking system affects
the real sector. This methodology was then applied to investigate the relationship
between the banking system and economic growth in the Italian regions. For the
ﬁrst time, an inefﬁciency index of the Italian regional banking systems was calcu-
lated which took account of all the banks operating in each region, giving each of
them a weight corresponding to their presence in that region. These inefﬁciency
indices were then used to analyse the convergence among regions in Italy. Our
empirical evidence points out the existence of an independent effect exerted by
bank efﬁciency on real growth which corroborates the presence of a Schumpete-
rian channel, emphasising the allocative function of banks.
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